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Abstract:  China exhibits above average savings and below average consumption as shares of 
total economic activity when compared with other countries.  At the same time, to create more 
balanced growth at home and rebalance key bilateral trade and capital flow relationships, China’s 
leadership is trying to increase domestic demand.  To complement studies that investigate the 
high rate of savings in China, this study focuses on the variation in consumption as a share of 
GDP across provinces between 1979 and 2004.  Drawing on well-established consumption 
theories and work done on savings behavior in China, this paper develops an empirical 
investigation of the variables hypothesized to influence the pattern of consumption across 
regions.   
 
We find that the normal, economic variables have a small explanatory power if significant at all, 
while the key variables influencing the macro consumption share are structural, and mostly 
related to government behavior.  For example, local government expenditure on health and 
education is significant and has a relatively large effect on consumption.  Consistent with this we 
also find a positive relationship between consumption shares and the size of the state sector and 
the share of tax revenue in GDP.  We also find some evidence that financial development has a 
positive effect on consumption shares.  Our results suggest that in order for domestic 
consumption to be increased in the future, new public and private options to replace the declining 
security and responsibility of the prior state-dominated system will be needed.     
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements:  
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Market Reforms and Consumption Puzzles in China 
 
 
1. Introduction 
As economies transition from planning to markets, numerous structural changes are 
expected to occur.  In a command economy, government allocates resources directly via the plan 
or indirectly via state enterprises.  With transition, resource allocation would increasingly be 
determined by households.  In the case of China, in particular, overall savings was kept high 
during the planned period, with consumption given a lower priority.  With reforms, then, private 
consumption would be expected to rise. 
Looking at gross domestic product (GDP) accounting from the expenditure side, 
consumption as a share of GDP has not increased with market reforms.  Government 
consumption has remained stable but household consumption has fallen (see figure 1). 
Households report that they consume more and better quality goods under the reform system.  
Retail sales and new shopping malls have grown tremendously along with incomes.  However, as 
a share of economy-wide activity, household consumption has fallen substantially (Mukherjee 
2007).  In addition, when compared to other economies such as India, China’s share of national 
consumption in GDP is substantially lower.  In the last two decades, China’s consumption share 
in GDP averaged 57 percent compared with India’s 75 percent, and China’s household 
consumption averaged only 43 percent compared with India’s 64 percent (see figure 2).1 
China’s policy makers themselves have declared that domestic market development that 
would allow increased consumption would be helpful for long-run, sustained growth (He and 
Kuijs 2007, Lardy 2007).  Policies to promote the domestic economy as the engine of growth, 
                                                 
1 World Development Indicators, www.worldbank.org, based on 1990-2005 data.  
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which includes consumption as well as better efficiency and innovation, are a centerpiece of 
President Hu Jintao’s “balanced growth” strategy (Hu 2004).   External demand has been the 
primary engine of growth for China with exports as a share of GDP approaching 30 percent.   
However, the challenges to shift demand from exports to domestic consumption are formidable.  
For example, when savings are high, consumption will be low, and China has some of the 
highest saving rates in the world (Kuijs 2005, He and Kuijs 2007).  While impressively high 
already, exports continue to grow.  Moves to appreciate the Yuan, encourage domestic sales, and 
lower export incentives have had little effect.   
Analysts of China’s current market development stage often make an analogy between 
the U.S. in the late 19th century and China today.  The U.S. economy after the Civil War 
increasingly brought regions together with the completion of coast to coast railways, the 
emergence of national media, and the beginnings of large corporations that viewed their market 
as national in scale from their inception.  The Incorporation of America, by Alan Trachtenberg 
(1982), eloquently captures this period of national market development and the effect on 
American business and culture.  Today, China’s leaders are building national highways, 
improving rail and air travel, and encouraging investment in the western part of the country on a 
large scale.  Provincial and local level “self-reliance” of the past is giving way to these new 
forces and policies.   This progress would be expected to generate more domestic demand for all 
kinds of goods and services, and serve as an important source of economic growth.  Detailed 
research by sector across countries conducted by the Global Institute of McKinsey concludes that 
domestic competition in product markets is second only to macro stability in helping to promote 
economic growth and productivity (Lewis 2004).  Establishing an integrated national market and 
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breaking local segmentation is vital for stimulating competition and domestic demand to propel 
long-term growth in China.  
 There is debate about how successful national market development has actually been in 
China.  Local protectionism is not dead.  For example, Young (2000) and Poncet (2003, 2005) 
argue that China’s domestic market continues to be highly fragmented.  However, Bai et al. 
(2004) find that although local government protection is strong for industries with high profit 
margins, the overall time trend of regional specialization of China’s industries has reversed an 
early drop in the mid-1980s, registering a significant increase in later years.  Park and Du (2005) 
also demonstrate that regional specialization increased beginning in the early 1980s.  
 In addition to the ongoing debate over market integration on the commodity and industry 
side, recent studies have examined capital market integration.  Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2002) 
study China’s provincial savings and investment rates at the aggregate level and argue that, 
contrary to expectations, reforms have not made capital more mobile across provincial borders.  
Other work, however, points to more normal market flows when the private sector is accounted 
for.  For example, after stripping out foreign funds, government appropriations and officially 
influenced funds, Qi (2006) finds that the behavior of capital flows in China’s commercial sector 
moves toward that of interstate flows in the U.S. and other advanced nations, suggesting a more 
integrated capital market than previously thought.   
The mixed evidence notwithstanding, promoting a national market that will allow 
domestic demand to be a leading stimulant for growth is now high on the central leadership’s 
agenda.   Blanchard and Giavazzi (2006) put forward a combination of policies they believe will 
work best in China to achieve balanced growth, including a decrease in savings, an increase in 
service provision, and a reevaluation of the Chinese currency.  He and Kuijs (2007) also suggest 
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that policy changes are required to rebalance China’s economy.  The bias towards infrastructure 
investment, for example, has meant under-provision of health and education.   Looking at where 
China is today in terms of the rebalancing and domestic demand policies, Lardy (2007) 
concludes that while the direction makes sense, progress has been uneven.   
China’s high savings rate is at the root of the problems, but explanations for high savings 
rates in China are so far incomplete.  Based on a thorough analysis of China’s national and 
sectoral flow of funds, Lin and Schramm (forthcoming) argue that a substantial portion of 
domestic savings ends up in the informal sector and cannot be accounted for.  They conclude 
there are serious structural challenges within China’s financial system that are preventing a more 
balanced distribution of resources.   
Taking a complementary but different tack, in this paper we explore the state of domestic 
consumption in China by examining variations in consumption patterns to see what factors 
influence consumption rates, and in particular household consumption rates.  We hope that this 
will indirectly shed light on why consumption appears to be low in China’s macro economy 
despite its move to a market system.    Most aspects of household consumption behavior in China 
on a micro level seem to be fairly in line with other countries at similar development levels 
(Clements and Qiang 2003, Wu 1999).   Our focus, therefore, is on a macroeconomic and 
institutional level of analysis, using cross-sectional and time-series data at the provincial level.  
Our dependent variable is household consumption expenditure as a share of total economic 
activity measured by gross domestic product by province.  The data we use is collected by the 
China statistical system and reported as the private consumption element of GDP, rather than 
micro level, household survey data.  The average consumption share of GDP in the reform 
period is between .4 and .5 (see figure 1), while the average consumption share of disposable 
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income on the micro level is over .8 (see figure 3).  Hence, these two data sets are capturing 
different phenomena.  By looking at variations across provinces, we explore variables from the 
literature that we have reason to believe could explain why consumption as a share of overall 
activity is so low.  By focusing on consumption, our goal is to complement the work that has 
been done on savings behavior in China.     
The next section reviews the literature on savings and consumption behavior, which leads 
us to identify key, measurable variables to examine empirically in section three.  The fourth 
section reports our empirical results, followed by a conclusion.   
 
2. Literature Review: Savings and Consumption in China 
 Figures for savings rates in China range from 30 percent of GDP (Modigliani and Cao 
2004) to 43 percent (Kujis 2005) and even as high as 50 percent (Horioka and Wan 2007), 
depending on definitions and time periods.  One line of inquiry into these savings rates has 
followed Modigliani’s work (1966) on the life-cycle hypothesis.  Using time series macro data 
for China from 1953 to 2000, Modigliani and Cao (2004) found that higher than average private 
savings in China during the reform period can be explained by the high growth rate of the 
economy and the one-child policy. The theory implies that high income growth rates would 
result in higher savings because incomes of the working age population would rise relative to 
those who are not working.  In addition, with only one child, household dependency rates would 
be relatively low, which is associated with higher savings rates.  Likewise, if there are more 
people consuming but not earning income (the definition of a dependent), then the average 
consumption share would be higher.  Consistent with the life cycle hypothesis, they did not find 
evidence that income per capita was an important factor.  Additional support for this result was 
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found by Masson et al. (1998).  Looking at pooled international cross-country data over time, 
they found that lower dependency ratios and higher growth rates were associated with higher 
savings.  They also found, however, that growth rates raised savings more in developing 
countries as compared with richer, developed countries, while the dependency ratio did not vary 
much by development level.      
 In another application of the life-cycle hypothesis, Horioka and Wan (2007) test for 
factors influencing household savings in China using a provincial data set for 1995-2004 based 
on household surveys.    Their estimation includes income growth, the interest rate, the inflation 
rate, lagged savings and the age structure of the population.   They find that lagged savings and 
income growth are the most important determinants of high savings in their estimations, while 
the interest rate and inflation rate have mixed results, and the demographic variables were not 
significant for the most part.  They conclude their work provides partial evidence of a life cycle 
explanation, and that if growth rates continue to be high, it is likely that savings rates will also 
remain high.    
 Another approach suggests that people are saving in China in order to deal with unusually 
high uncertainty due to the lack of ability to insure for health, retirement and other contingencies 
especially as state subsidies for these items have declined without private options to take their 
place (Wong and Yu 2002).  Yoo and Giles (2002) also find precautionary behavior due to 
uncertainty that is specific to rural households in China.     
 Research on consumption—the flip side of savings—in China has looked at differences 
in consumer behavior across time, geographies, urban-rural lifestyles and income groups.   Song 
et al. (1996) use a permanent income hypothesis framework and a time varying parameter 
approach to model consumer behavior in China comparing pre and post reform periods covering 
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annual data from 1952-1993.  They find changes in consumer behavior over time consistent with 
central planning in the early period and with market reforms later.  For example, they find a low 
marginal propensity to consume during the planned period that is consistent with shortages, 
controlled prices and rationing.  With market reforms they find a substantial rise in the marginal 
propensity to consume in reaction to suppressed demand in the early years, with a fall later.  
Overall, then, consumer behavior was as expected, and their model was able to capture the social 
and economic changes in China over time. 
 Another study using national level annual data from 1961 to 1998 focuses on uncertainty 
and liquidity (Zhang and Wan 2004).  This study finds that there is a major behavioral shift after 
1983, and that liquidity constraints and uncertainty reinforce each other resulting in very low 
consumption and high savings under the market reforms.    
 A few studies utilize cross-sectional data.  Wong and Yu (2002) examine data from 1991 
to 1998 to find increasing income differentials have affected people’s consumption habits.  This 
is consistent with varying consumption behavior between rich and poor countries more generally 
(Seale and Regmi 2006).  In the case of China, Wong and Yu point out, however, that some rural 
families have done well, so that a simple rural-poor versus urban-rich characterization is not 
accurate.  Nonetheless, on average, rural households seem to exhibit different consumption 
behavior as compared with urban households (Wu 1999, 2004), as well as different savings 
behavior as reported by Horioka and Wan (2007).      
 
3. Investigation of China’s Aggregate Consumption Patterns under Market Reforms 
 Based on this body of literature and the significant economic system changes China has 
experienced in the post-Mao reform period, we develop an empirical model that includes both 
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standard economic variables and a set of structural factors that have shifted along with the 
changes in the economic system.  Our study adds to the current literature by utilizing pooled time 
series and provincial cross-sectional data over a longer period than the household survey data 
cover.  In addition, since the micro survey data shows that Chinese households behave in 
familiar ways in terms of consumption and savings behavior, we are looking for other 
explanations for the low consumption share puzzle in our approach.    
 The equation to be estimated for ( i ) provinces and ( t ) time periods is as follows: 
(1)  

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Where: 
itY
C






   = household consumption as a share of provincial domestic product 
itYˆ    = the annual growth in provincial domestic product 
∏it   = inflation rate 
itr   = real interest rate (nominal interest rate minus inflation) 
ii DP ,   = provincial and time dummies 
Z  is a vector of economic system variables: 
 Sit: the state share of industrial gross output value; 
Git: local government expenditure on education, health and culture as a share of total 
local government expenditure; 
 Fit: the share of loans plus deposits in provincial domestic product; 
 Uit: the share of urban employment in total provincial employment; 
 dit: dependency ratios; 
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 ity : provincial domestic product per capita; 
 Tit: local tax revenue as a share of GDP. 
  
The empirical model used here combines standard consumption determinants relating to 
income, price levels and income growth with a set of economic system characteristics expected 
to influence or constrain households’ consumption decisions.  We use the share of household 
consumption in gross domestic product 
itY
C






 as our dependent variable, where consumption 
includes durable and non-durable goods.  This is the share that appears to behave differently in 
China compared to other countries.   Our panel data set includes provincial data for 31 provinces 
between 1979 and 2004.2   The variation across provinces allows us to explore possible factors 
relating to differences in income levels and reform progress, in addition to the standard 
consumption variables.  
To test the life cycle model’s prediction that faster growth in income will lead to an 
increase in savings and therefore a decrease in consumption shares, we use growth in provincial 
GDP.  Inflation is included with the expectation that higher inflation can cause households to 
save less and thus consume more.   
In theory, interest rates would also be expected to influence savings, and therefore 
consumption, with lower rates leading to increased consumption.  Nominal interest rates, 
however, are available for China’s national economy but not by province, and only for more 
recent years.  We calculated real interest rates by subtracting inflation from nominal interest 
rates.  So far the reforms in China may not have progressed to a stage where interest rates 
influence either consumers or savers-investors very much partly because the rates are set very 
                                                 
2 Please see the appendix for sources of all data used in our model. 
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low (Economist 2007).   Indeed, the market interest rates are actually often negative when 
inflation is taken into account.  So the normal relationship between consumption and interest 
rates cannot be expected.  For these reasons, we do not include interest rates in most our 
estimations. 
For the system variables in the Z vector, we include a number of factors raised by the 
literature.  One is the hypothesis of precautionary savings.  To the extent that the state sector was 
no longer going to assure households’ employment with the package of “iron rice bowl” perks 
that went along with state sector employment, a reasonable hypothesis is that households would 
adapt to this new environment of uncertainty.  In this study we use the state share in total 
industrial output value as a proxy for uncertainty, expecting that with a lower state sector, 
families would opt for more precautionary savings and therefore consume less.  
Another interpretation of the effect of the size of the state share is that provinces with 
more state companies are able to obtain relative more funding from state banks since the banks 
lend primarily to the large SOEs and not to the private sector (Boyreau-Debray and Wei 2002).3  
Having access to financing would help reduce uncertainty for those working at these companies.  
It is much less likely, for example, that SOEs receiving state financial backing would go 
bankrupt as compared with private firms.  It is also more likely that they would be able to fund 
higher wages and benefits than non-state companies.  Further, while small and marginal SOEs 
were being sold and closed in the earlier years, since the mid-1990s, stronger companies and 
those in priority sectors have done quite well (Li and Putterman 2008).  
A second, related factor that might influence household consumption is that of 
government expenditure.  If the government is taking care of certain needs, such as allocating 
grain, supplying education and healthcare, etc., then households would not need to save for these 
                                                 
3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this alternative interpretation.   
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possible expenditures in the future.  With reform, local government provision of services has 
varied greatly across areas, and for some services, has declined.   For example, if we look at 
healthcare spending depicted in figure 4, we can see that the share spent by individuals has 
increased steadily from 1990 to 2000 while the government’s share has fallen.   The third 
category, “society’s share” captures contributions by companies and other institutions and 
entities.  The data that are available at the provincial level, and that we use in our estimation, 
represent the share of local government expenditure that is used for health, education and culture.      
  A third system factor we would expect to influence household consumption is the ability 
of households to use the newly marketized financial system to smooth consumption over time.  
In principle, with market development, liquidity options should expand and therefore not pose a 
constraint to consumption.  Commonly used financial development indicators are the percentage 
of total financial assets to GDP (Goldsmith 1969) or money supply measures such as M2 as a 
share of GDP.  However, we do not have access to financial assets data for all provinces for the 
period of time we study, and money supply measures are appropriate for cross-country analyses 
but will not vary by province.  Therefore, we follow other scholars and use the total deposits and 
loans issued by all financial institutions as a percent of GDP reported by each province as a 
proxy for financial development (Zhou 2004).  We would expect this coefficient to be positive if 
more financial development lessened liquidity constraints. 
 The fourth variable we use to capture changes due to reforms is the degree of 
urbanization measured as the percent of urban employment in the total labor force.  Other work 
has shown that rural and urban households exhibit different consumption patterns (Wu 2004).  
Household survey data for China show that the average propensity to consume in urban areas is 
near .9 while in rural areas it is nearer to .8, and that the difference between the two has varied 
 13 
over time (see figure 5).  Since provinces vary in their relative importance of rural activity to 
urban, this difference could affect consumption patterns in the aggregate.  Reforms have led to 
rapid urbanization and significant job transfers out of agriculture into industry and services, and 
therefore we expect this to affect consumption patterns over time as well.  Hence we would 
expect this coefficient to be positive, with higher urbanization explaining higher consumption 
shares.      
Our fifth variable is provincial output per capita.  Cross-country studies have shown that 
consumption patterns in rich countries differ from those in poor countries (Clements and Qiang 
2003).  In particular, consistent with Engel’s law, expenditure shares on food in rich countries 
were lower than poorer countries.  Also, reforms have benefited some provinces more than 
others, as reflected in varying growth rates and average incomes.  We hypothesize that 
consumption patterns would differ across provinces as well.  But due to possible multiple 
influences, the relationship could go in either direction.  For example, as households become 
richer they spend a smaller proportion of income on food, but it may be that richer families have 
a choice to spend relatively more on housing.  
  To account for the dependency burden for households on consumption from the life-cycle 
model, we use the dependency ratio as our sixth variable.   This ratio is defined as the proportion 
of the population that is either under 14 or over 65. We expect a positive relationship here, as 
more dependents would mean more consumer expenditure on average.    
 Finally, our seventh variable is the overall provincial tax burden.  Since our dependent 
variable uses provincial gross output in the denominator rather than a disposable income 
measure, we add this tax variable to see what effect it has on overall consumption.  For provinces 
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where the tax burden is higher, we would expect the consumption share to be lower.   The 
measure is the share of tax revenue in provincial GDP.   
 
4. Estimation and Results  
 We begin our estimation with a pooled, cross-provincial fixed effect model.  One of the 
advantages of this approach is that it controls for omitted variables that vary across provinces but 
do not change over time.  For example, people’s life styles differ depending on what part of the 
country they live in, and this may affect household consumption behavior.  In addition, vast 
differences in economic, industrial and fiscal structures across provinces are likely to influence 
household consumption.  The intercepts generated for each province in this model should absorb 
the influences of these omitted variables that differ for each province but are constant over time. 
We then add time-fixed effects to control for variables that are constant across provinces 
but evolve over time.  For example, we see the growth of private industry, elimination of the 
“iron rice bowl,” shrinking influence of state sectors, introduction of new healthcare regimes, 
changes in employment benefits, etc., nationwide as economic reforms deepen in China.    
Table 1 reports our descriptive statistics as well as the between-province standard 
deviation and within-province standard deviation (over the entire time period) of each variable in 
our model.  This table confirms the considerable variations of the dependent and independent 
variables of interest in our data set.   
Model 1 reported in table 2 includes the standard growth and inflation variables and the 
economic system variables using the full data set from 1979-2004 with provincial fixed effects as 
represented by equation (1).  This model is estimated with ordinary least squares.  The F-
statistics of the test on the significance of provincial fixed effects show that there are significant 
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variations among provinces.   The growth rate of provincial income is significant and negative, 
reflecting that consumption tends to lag behind growth as suggested by the life cycle model, 
however inflation is insignificant. 
Our two main economic system variables, the size of the state sector and local 
government spending on health and education, are both significant and positive as expected with 
government spending resulting in a substantially larger coefficient (.67 compared with .07).  The 
strong effects from these two factors are consistent with how the economic system in China has 
changed during the reform period.  While the state sector has declined with reforms, when it still 
exists it provides more employment security and corporate responsibility to cover an individual’s 
healthcare and housing costs as well as better retirement security than the non-state sector.  
These benefits help reduce the uncertainty brought by economic reforms pushing toward a 
market system, therefore reducing the need for precautionary savings.  Similar reasons apply to 
the governments’ efforts to provide more health care and education services to the residents, 
which will also reduce precautionary savings for possible medical needs or education cost for 
children. 
The next two variables, financial development and urbanization were not significant in 
this specification.  Financial development does become significant in later models but the degree 
of urbanization does not explain consumption shares in our study.   
The dependency variable was significant but was negative, implying higher savings when 
there were more children and elderly.  This is the opposite of what the life cycle theory predicts.  
The Horioka and Wan (2007) study based on Chinese household survey data also could not 
establish an expected pattern or significance for their demographic variables.  They cite another 
study (Chamon and Prasad 2006) using the same data set that found savings increased with age 
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and was the highest for the elderly.  Since in pre-reform China saving for retirement was not a 
household or individual responsibility or even an option, it may be that the uncertainties around 
the many changes in Chinese society during this more recent period have influenced decision 
making in unexpected ways.  Perhaps, for example, instead of households having a higher 
consumption share because they are caring for children and older family members, they try to 
save more in order to insure that the children will be able to attend school and later college.  We 
know, for example, that the tuition for schools at all levels has increased rapidly—perhaps 25 
fold for college tuition— and that this could affect household savings and consumption 
behavior.4  According to a survey implemented by the People’s Bank of China, the fast and steep 
increase in tuition and schooling fees has become the primary motive for household savings.5  In 
terms of retirement, for centuries people in China relied on their children to take care of them in 
old age.  The one child policy may cause people to save more because they are less assured of 
this safety net.  
Provincial output per capita was insignificant. One factor that might lessen the effect of 
different levels of development is that many people from poor provinces work elsewhere.  To the 
extent that they send home their earnings, then consumption would be higher than expected for 
poor provinces.6   
The tax variable was significant but positive, which is the opposite sign from 
expectations.  Here, a higher tax burden results in higher consumption shares.  As this measure is 
                                                 
4 http://www.bzpi.gov.cn/Body.asp?Id=330. 
5 See the report published by Bazhong Shi Price Bureau (Sichuan Province).  Report available at: 
http://www.bzpi.gov.cn/Body.asp?Id=330.  There are many other similar reports on this topic.  For example, see the 
article on education expenses at the Xinhua News Agency (the State News Agency) at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2005-09/26/content_3544715.htm 
6 We would thank Xuepeng Liu for suggesting that migration may be playing a role. 
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not actually related to disposable income, but instead is the tax revenue as a share of provincial 
GDP, it may in fact be measuring the importance of government instead of the tax burden. 
 Although model 1 provides reasonable estimates with useful implications for 
understanding consumption patterns in China, the standard ordinary least squares estimation is 
not correct if consumption is determined simultaneously with some of the other variables in our 
models.  For example, GDP data enter both sides of the estimated equation a number of times, 
and macroeconomic variables in the same system may generate reverse causality issues, which 
also might produce endogeneity.   
 We resolve these issues by using instrumental variables, employing generalized method 
of moments (GMM) estimators.  We implemented the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test to 
examine whether any of our suspected endogenous variables can be treated as exogenous and 
reported the DWH test results (with the exogeneity hypothesis) in all subsequent tables.  We find 
that the GDP growth rate and GDP per capita can be treated as exogenous variables based on test 
results.  However, our state sector size and government expenditure variables are endogenous.  
These endogenous variables by definition must be related to the residual terms of the regression.  
We suspect that this correlation with the residual terms may be caused by other omitted variables 
that affect household consumption ratios.  For example, as mentioned earlier, the pace of tuition 
increases for schools at all levels certainly affect household savings and consumption behavior.   
These types of factors as well as government policies on social security issues and varying health 
benefits for rural and urban residents are likely to influence household consumption behavior.  
However, our data set does not include direct measures of all these influences as regressors.  
Further, all of these issues (or potentially omitted variables) are closely related to government 
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behavior, thus causing the state sector size and government expenditure variables to be 
endogenous.  
 To correct for these problems, we selected the lagged values of the endogenous variables 
to use as instrumental variables (IVs) for the corrected estimation.  While local government 
expenditure might be endogenous for the current period and therefore correlated with the current 
period’s residual, the value from the previous period is probably not correlated with the shock of 
the current period it .   For each endogenous variable, we tested up to three-period lagged 
values to see if any of them could serve as an appropriate IV.  We tested the IVs’ relevance to 
the endogenous regressor as well as its exogeneity to the error term using Hansen J statistics 
reported as the over-identifying restrictions tests for all GMM models.  Model 2, Model 4 and all 
subsequent models utilize the GMM estimation.7     
 The basic findings of model 1 remain robust in model 2.  The effect of local 
governments’ expenditure on education and health not only continues to be significant, but also 
doubles in its magnitude (reaching from .67 to 1.17).  In our data set for 1979-2004, the average 
ratio of government spending on health and education out of total revenue is .25.  An increase of 
one standard deviation to .3 will on average raise the ratio of household consumption to GDP by 
.06, which represents a 12 percent increase from a mean of .49 to .55.  Again, the second 
strongest effect comes from the size of state sector in the local economy. The GDP growth rate, 
dependency ratio and the tax variable have the same impact on the dependent variable in model 2 
as compared with mode 1, and inflation and GDP per capita are insignificant as before.     
                                                 
7 We tested our models with both standard two-stage least square models as well as GMM estimation.  Both 
methods generate very similar results.  GMM estimation normally produces more efficient estimates under over-
identification and the two-stage least squares estimator can be considered a GMM estimator with a suboptimal 
weighting matrix when the errors are not i.i.d. (Baum 2006, p. 197).   
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The next two base models (models 3 and 4) add time to our estimates along with cross-
provincial effects.  Because China went through major changes regarding the tax, banking and 
corporate governance systems beginning in 1994 (Naughton 2007), we included time dummy 
variables chosen for several time periods to capture the time trend in China’s economic reforms 
and economic activities.8  Figure 1 shows that the household consumption to GDP ratio was 
relatively stable until 1989.  Therefore, our first time dummy starts from 1990 and ends in 1994 
when China started a major fiscal reform – tax sharing system (fenshuizhi).  The next time 
dummy covers the period 1995 to 1999, the year that marked the beginning of China’s residential 
housing reforms.9  Housing reforms changed the former scheme of housing allocation among 
urban employees, which is likely to affect household consumption behavior.  The last time 
dummy variable covers the last time period between 1999 and 2004. 
 Model 3 is reported in table 2, and replicates model 1 except that these estimates include 
the time fixed effects as well as the provincial fixed effects.  The newly generated time dummy 
variables are statistically significant and produce coefficients with a clear trend: over time the 
coefficients decrease each year.  This is consistent with the decreasing trend in China’s 
household consumption to GDP ratio.  Model 4 replicates model 2 (both utilizing GMM) but 
adds time period dummies.  Since DWH test confirms endogeneity issues for model 3, we will 
focus on interpreting model 4, which controls the endogeneity in model 3. 
Local governments’ expenditure on health, education and culture still remains the 
strongest factor in model 4 although the size of the coefficient dropped from 1.17 to .9.  The 
newly added time effects most likely picked up some of the variations in the dependent variable, 
                                                 
8 We also estimated our models using one time dummy for each year, which results in estimating 24 more 
coefficients in our model, and losing many degrees of freedom.  This generated near perfect collinearity problems.  
To capture time fixed effects while still resolving the potential collinearity issues, we constructed dummy variables 
for time periods. 
9 See discussions of housing reforms at http://finance1.jrj.com.cn/news/2008-06-28/000003797311.html 
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reducing the impact of this variable compared to models 1 and 2.  The state sector variable is 
insignificant in this model, perhaps for similar reasons, although the tax variable remains 
significant.  The effect of the GDP growth rate on household consumption remains the same.  
Inflation, the dependency variable, the size of the urban sector and GDP per capita are 
insignificant with the added time fixed effect, but now financial market development becomes a 
new factor that influences household consumption ratios.  We see that higher financial market 
development fosters more consumption, consistent with expectations.  Financial development 
has the expected positive sign, suggesting that better access to credit helps to smooth 
consumption decisions and so does not suppress consumption.  Recently, studies have shown 
that better access to credit increases the average poor household’s total borrowing by about 62 
Yuan per capita (Han and Hare 2008). 
 Overall, there are some changes in the estimation results by model 4 as compared with 
model 2, but the strongest effect on household consumption remains the local governments’ 
expenditure on health, education and culture, followed by the tax share.  We believe that model 4 
with provincial and time fixed effects is the best model for what we are trying to analyze, and 
hence is our preferred base model.   
Table 3 presents a series of robustness checks on model 4.  Model 5 re-estimates model 4 
using two-year averages of all data.  The results are fairly similar.  The joint F-stat on all 
excluded instruments (5.83) is smaller compared to that of other models, though it is significant 
at the 1% level.  We conducted further analyses on the relevance and strength of the instruments 
to the endogenous variable for this model.  The additional partial R-square statistics in the first-
stage regression are reported (16%) and show that the instruments do have fairly strong 
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explanatory power to the endogenous variable – government spending.  Hence we conclude that 
the instruments are appropriate. 
Models 6 and 7 use alternative measures of the size of the state sector.  Model 6, which 
adopts the state sector’s share of fixed investment as the state size measure, generated similar 
results as the base model which uses the share of state industrial output in total industrial output.  
Model 7 uses the share of state employment in total employment to capture the importance of the 
state sector.  The results of model 7 show that the share of state employment has a statistically 
significant and positive impact on household consumption as a share to GDP.  It seems that the 
state sector’s influence on consumption enters through the employment effect (rather than the 
measure of the size of the state economy as illustrated by models 4 and 6).  Though the state 
share in the economy is declining in the reform process by all three measures, the better 
employment benefits of the state sector seem to boost consumption.10   
Model 8 includes the variance of income across time for each province as an alternative 
measure of uncertainty  to the state sector.11  The more variation a province experiences, the 
more uncertain people’s income.  We would expect that this would dampen the consumption 
share on average.  This variable did indeed have a negative and significant coefficient.  The 
results for the other variables included in model 8 were also consistent with our earlier results, 
with the added significance of the dependency variable.   
As a further robustness check, table 4 reports estimates for the more recent period, 1996-
2004.  We include the interest rate because it is available for this period, although it turns out to 
be insignificant.  However, inflation becomes significant, and our other key variables—
                                                 
10 DWH tests show that we can treat the state sector variable as an exogenous regressor so there is only one 
endogenous variable in models 5-7. 
11 The calculation of the variance of income gives each province a variance figure for all years in the data set (i.e., 
no time variation in each province).  Therefore we had to drop the provincial fixed effect in estimating this model or 
the income variance will lead to perfect collinearity as another set of “provincial fixed effects.” 
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government spending, the size of the state sector, and financial development—continue to be 
significant.  We also see smaller first-stage F-statistics for models 9 and 10 (similar to that of 
model 5).  Since we have two endogenous variables here (the size of state sector and government 
spending), we also reported Shea partial R-square.12  Generally, a very small Shea partial R-
square indicates that instruments lack sufficient relevance to explain all endogenous variables.  
Though our Shea partial R-square is not extremely small (6% for model 9 and 7% for model 10), 
we did find that the instrument for the state sector variable has no explanatory power for the 
endogenous government spending regressor, Git.  Hence adding the instrument for the state 
sector variable in the first-stage regression for Git adds more noise, which drives the F-statistics 
down.  This is also consistent with the significance of the F-statistics on only the two instruments 
for Git (as opposed to the joint F-statistics that also includes the state sector’s instrument), as well 
as the significance of t-statistics and p-value on the two instruments for Git in the first stage 
regressions.  Therefore, we believe the lagged values of the government spending variable are 
still reasonable instruments for itself.      
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion   
 We use various models and estimation techniques to examine what factors affect the 
variation in household consumption as a share of GDP.  Based on the life cycle hypothesis, other 
studies found that savings would rise with higher growth rates in income, and we found the 
mirror result that consumption lagged income growth.  However, variations in income growth 
explain only a small part of the variation in consumption patterns.  In our study, the most 
significant and robust discovery is that reducing motivations for precautionary savings through 
                                                 
12 The Shea partial R-square is a useful measure in the case of multiple endogenous regressors (Shea 1997).  It takes 
the intercorrelations among instruments into account.   
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government’s fiscal responsibility at the local level will have the strongest effect in increasing 
household consumption.  All of our models show that higher government expenditure on 
education and health has the biggest impact on increasing household consumption.  The share of 
the state sector also seems to be important as it serves a similar purpose by providing more job 
security and better benefits than the private sector.  While the positive results of this variable are 
not as robust as those of government spending, the alternative measure which captures the size of 
the state sector through the employment share was significant.  This underscores the likelihood 
that the state sector variable is a proxy for certainty.  The share of tax revenue in provincial GDP 
was also significant in our preferred specification and in most of the robustness tests.  Contrary 
to our expectation, it resulted in a positive coefficient and therefore may instead be reflecting a 
higher role of government as a substitute for private spending.  In most of our models the 
significance of the development of financial markets to provide more financing channels to 
stimulate consumption was also demonstrated.   
 The dependency ratio and inflation are not always robust regressors with significant 
influence on household consumption to GDP ratios.  Our inflation measure may suffer from the 
same problem as interest rates—that is, the official data understate the real situation.  The 
dependency ratio, when significant, had the opposite sign (except in one case with the two-year 
averages) from what life-cycle theory would suggest, but was consistent with what other studies 
have found in the case of China.  There is a need for further research to understand the effect of 
changing dependency ratios on household behavior in the case of China. Separating the young 
from the elderly to see if there is a divergence in spending based on the two dependency groups 
would be one approach.   Urban employment—our measure of the size of the urban sector—was 
never significant, despite our expectations from other work that it would matter.  In addition to 
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the possibility that our official urban employment data fail to capture the very large “floating 
population” of migrant workers in urban areas, this may also imply that while the types of goods 
and services that are purchased may be different in urban and rural areas, our data does not 
reveal any difference in overall consumption expenditures as a share of provincial GDP.    
 These results point to several trends and also raise additional puzzles.  From this macro, 
expenditure side view, private consumption has not kept up with growth in total economic 
activity as measured by GDP.  Though the focus of our study is to analyze the determinants that 
affect the provincial variation in private consumption as a share of provincial GDP, one further 
hypothesis that may explain the overall falling trend of the consumption share is that household 
income as fallen behind overall growth.  Indeed, several reports show that the compensation to 
employees as a share of GDP (measured from the income approach) “has declined from 60% in 
early years of economic reforms to only 38.7% in 2006” even for Guangdong Province, one of 
the most wealthy provinces in China.13  In addition, others have pointed out that wages for 
employees in private firms have not keep up with the GDP growth.14  This trend may reflect a 
time-lag; however, the trend has persisted throughout the reform period and may be the result of 
something more structural that favors capital over labor and producers over consumers.  These 
trends do not bode well for a reverse of the consumption share trends.  In addition, as 
demonstrated in this study, to help increase domestic consumption in the future, new options to 
replace the declining security of the prior state-dominated system will be needed.  As long as the 
reform process results in more privatization without insurance options and ways to smooth 
consumption and diversify risk, the incentives to save may overwhelm the incentives to spend.   
                                                 
13 http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/gd.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-07/11/content_13789316.htm.  Also 
available at http://news.sina.com.cn/pl/2008-07-11/073415913142.shtml. 
14 Article available at: http://news.0898.net/2007/11/24/347028.html 
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 Some analysts argue that the time for building China’s domestic engine of growth is 
when growth is robust (Summers 2007).   Japan’s experience shows that building domestic 
demand in a downturn does not work.  A response of Chinese consumption to wealth effects tied 
to changing values of equities is already evident (Deutsche Bank 2008).  Releasing competitive 
forces across sectors and geography within China could help a great deal to stimulate domestic 
demand.  Building a national transit infrastructure, opening the financial sector, encouraging 
rural development and crafting a competition law are some of the policy pieces already moving 
forward in this next stage of China’s development.     
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Data Appendix 
 
Household and government final consumption and GDP (expenditure approach) data for China 
are obtained from the University of Michigan China Center Database website, 
http://chinadatacenter.org.  Household consumption expenditure includes the total expenditure of 
resident households on final consumption of goods and services.   
 
The Michigan China Center Database also reports industrial output value by enterprise 
ownership for each province over our study period. We took the gross industrial output value 
from state owned enterprises (SOEs) and then divide by the total industrial output value of that 
province to calculate our estimate of the “state share” variable. 
 
The government expenditure variable is the ratio of expenditure on education, health and culture 
out of total local government expenditure by province.  These data are available at the Michigan 
Data Center for 1978-2005.  These data are also available in various China Fiscal Yearbooks 
(Zhongguo Caizheng Nianjian) and China Statistical Yearbook (Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian).  
The main categories under local expenditure are capital construction, enterprises innovation 
funds, expenditure for supporting agricultural production, expenditure for government 
administration, and operating expenses for health and education and culture.  Our local 
expenditure data are not the budgetary data, but are the actual spending data at the end of each 
fiscal year.  Our provincial total expenditure data do not include transfers to central government, 
or the expenditure for using loans of national debt.  
 
Inflation data are calculated from the provincial consumer price indices reported from the 
Michigan data base.  
 
Interest rates are financial institutions’ one-year savings deposit interest rates for households, 
reported by various years of China Statistical Yearbook.  Note that while nominal interest rates 
are the same for all provinces, because the variation in provincial consumer price indices, the 
real interest rates vary from province to province. 
 
The GDP per capita data also come from various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook. 
 
We estimate the urban share of employment by using the employed person statistics in urban 
areas versus the total employed number in each province reported by the Michigan China Center 
Database. 
 
Our financial development indicator measures the total amount of deposits and loans processed 
by all financial institutions as a percentage of GDP data in each province. These data are 
available from the NBS publication Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years 
of New China (Xin Zhongguo 50 Nian Tongji Ziliao Huibian). 
 
The dependency ratio is defined by the population 14 and under plus those 65 and older as a 
proportion of the total population.  These data are available from 1990 to 2005, and were 
provided by the U.S. Census Bureau.   
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We take the local total tax revenue reported by Michigan China Center Database divided by 
provincial level GDP as our measure of tax burden for each province.  These data are from 
various years of China Statistical Yearbook. 
 
 The micro-level survey data on rural and urban households’ disposable income and living 
expenditure are obtained from the Historical Statistical Almanac for China’s Provinces, 
Autonomous Regions and Cities, 1949-1989 and various years of the China Statistical Yearbooks 
for more recent years. 
 
Finally, we take the fixed investment data from the Michigan China Center Database and from 
various years of China Statistical Yearbook.  The share of state sector employment is calculated 
using data reported in various years of China Labour Statistical Yearbook. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observation
s 
       
Household 
consumption 
as a % of GDP 
overall 0.49 0.11 0.20 0.86 N =     771 
 between  0.08 0.30 0.64 n =      31 
 within  0.08 0.27 0.80  
       
Inflation overall 6.74 7.42 -3.60 29.70 N =     749 
 between  0.63 5.41 8.10 n =      31 
 within  7.40 -4.96 28.75  
       
State 
Sector Size 
overall 0.57 0.24 0.04 0.94 N =     786 
 between  0.13 0.27 0.79 n =      31 
 within  0.20 -0.09 0.94  
       
Government 
Expenditure 
on Health, 
Education 
& Culture 
overall 0.25 0.04 0.13 0.43 N =     781 
 between  0.03 0.19 0.29 n =      31 
 within  0.04 0.13 0.43  
       
Financial 
Development 
overall 1.86 3.14 0.27 8.10 N =     769 
 between  0.80 1.02 5.13 n =      31 
 within  3.03 -2.77 82.07  
       
Share of Urban 
employment 
overall 0.31 0.16 0.11 0.81 N =     766 
 between  0.16 0.15 0.72 n =      31 
 within  0.03 0.16 0.42  
       
Dependency 
Ratio 
overall 46.97 9.24 25.59 69.66 N =     496 
 between  7.37 31.55 60.11 n =      31 
 within  5.71 24.16 57.66  
       
GDP per capita overall 4298.26 5825.77 204.00 55307.00 N =     806 
 between  3115.08 1440.01 16506.18 n =      31 
 within  4953.50 -9639.92 43099.08  
       
Real Interest 
Rate 
overall -0.73 5.33 -19.62 8.19 N = 434 
 between  0.60 -2.29 0.21 n = 31 
 within  5.30 -18.91 8.90  
     (continued 
on next 
page) 
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Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
       
Tax Burden overall 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.22 N =     718 
 between  0.03 0.04 0.15 n =      31 
 within  0.03 0.01 0.16  
       
Share of SOE 
employment 
overall 0.75 0.10 0.34 1.04 N =     799 
 between  0.08 0.55 0.93 n =      31 
 within  0.05 0.43 1.06  
       
Share of State 
Sector Fixed 
Investment 
overall 62.91 20.44 0.00 100.00 N =     792 
 between  14.28 19.72 91.70 n =      31 
 within  15.15 -9.45 113.87  
       
GDP Per Capita 
Variance 
overall 4043.65 3024.44 1180.80 15934.93 N =     806 
 between  3072.53 1180.80 15934.93 n =      31 
 within  0.00 4043.65 4043.65  
       
Normalized GDP 
Per Capita 
Variance 
overall 0.69 0.52 0.20 2.74 N =     806 
 between  0.53 0.20 2.74 n =      31 
 within  0.00 0.69 0.69  
       
Micro rural 
consumption ratio 
Overall 0.83 0.48 0.1 9.62 N =     765 
 between  0.11 0.67 1.21 n =      31 
 within  0.47 0.08 9.24  
       
Micro urban 
consumption ratio 
overall 0.88 0.09 0.08 1.15 N =     676 
 between  0.02 0.81 0.91 n =      31 
 within  0.09 0.098 1.14  
       
Micro rural income 
variance 
(normalized) 
overall 0.81 0.38 0.24 1.95 N =     806 
 between  0.39 0.24 1.95 n =      31 
 within  0 0.81 0.81  
       
Micro urban 
income variance 
(normalized) 
overall 0.77 0.58 0.51 3.80 N =     806 
 between  0.59 0.51 3.80 n =      31 
 within  0 0.77 0.77  
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Table 2: Estimation Results of Base Models 1979-2004 (Dependent Variable: Household 
Consumption to GDP) 
 
Regressors 
(symbol) 
Regressors Model 1 Model 2 
(GMM) 
Model 3 
 
 
Model 4 
(GMM) 
 
Yˆ  GDP Growth 
Rate) 
-0.001*** 
(.0004) 
-0.001*** 
(.0004) 
-0.001*** 
(.0003) 
-0.001*** 
(.0003) 
∏it  Inflation 0.0007 
(.28) 
0.0001 
(.0006) 
.0003 
(.0005) 
-0.000 
(.0006) 
Sit  State 
Sector Size 
.07*** 
(.17) 
.09*** 
(.03) 
.004 
(.02) 
.03 
(.03) 
Git  Gov’t Spending 
on health etc. 
0.67*** 
(.14) 
1.17*** 
(.16) 
.34*** 
(.12) 
0.9*** 
(.19) 
Fit Financial Dev. 
Indicator 
-.002 
 (.007) 
.006 
 (.007) 
.02*** 
 (.005) 
.02*** 
 (.005) 
Uit Share of Urban 
Employment 
.09 
(.08) 
-.02 
(.09) 
.05 
(.07) 
-.04 
(.08) 
dit Dependency 
Ratio 
-0.001** 
(.0005) 
-0.001** 
(.0005) 
-0.0005 
(.0005) 
-0.0005 
(.0005) 
ity  
GDP Per Capita 
 
6.03E-06 
(1.04E-06) 
1.66E-06 
(1.10E-06) 
8.78E-07 
(1.01E-06) 
1.44E-06 
(1.09E-06) 
Tit Tax Rev. to GDP .68*** 
(.11) 
.74* 
(.11) 
.19 
(.13) 
.42*** 
(.13) 
Dummy90_94  
 
  -.1*** 
(.02) 
-.07*** 
(.02) 
Dummy95_99    -.14*** 
(.02) 
-.09*** 
(.02) 
Dummy00_04    -17*** 
(.02) 
-.12*** 
(.02) 
      
Prov. effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects  No No Yes Yes 
Instruments   Sit lag1, Git lag1, 
Git lag2 
 
 
 
Sit lag1, Git lag1, 
Git lag2 
DWH test   .000  .000 
First-stage F 
stat & degrees 
freedom 
  41.37, 3 
14.52, 3 
 27.71, 3 
13.35, 3 
Over-
identifying  
J stat 
  .41  .63 
Time Range  79-04 79-04 79-04 79-04 
# of Obs.  428 423 428 423 
Adj. R-square  .81 .39 .85 .51 
F-stat   54.98 25.72 70.61 32.56 
      
Note: * denotes 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance levels 
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Table 3: Estimation Results of Robustness Test (Dependent Variable: Household 
Consumption to GDP) 
 
Regressors 
(symbol) 
Regressors Model 5 
(2 year avg 
data) 
Model 6 
(Alt. State 
Sector Size) 
Model 7 
(Alt. State 
Sector Size) 
Model 8 
(Add Variance of 
Income) 
Yˆ  GDP Growth 
Rate) 
 
-0.001** 
(.0006) 
-0.002** 
(.0004) 
-0.001** 
(.0003) 
-0.0009* 
(.0005) 
∏it  Inflation 0.0005 
(.0008) 
-0.0004 
(.0006) 
0.0002 
(.0005) 
0.0008 
(.0006) 
Sit  State 
Sector Size 
-.002 
(.02) 
  .22*** 
(.02) 
Sit   alt 1 Fixed Inv. to 
SOE 
 -.0004 
(.0003) 
  
Sit   alt 2 Share of SOE 
Employment 
  .13** 
(.06) 
 
Git  Gov’t Spending 
on health etc. 
.74* 
(.28) 
.95*** 
(.19) 
.82*** 
(.19) 
1.09*** 
(.07) 
Fit Financial Dev. 
Indicator 
 .02** 
(.006) 
.01*** 
 (.005) 
.02* 
 (.005) 
-.02*** 
 (.006) 
Uit Share of Urban 
Employment 
-.17 
(.11) 
.05 
(.09) 
.03 
(.08) 
.009 
(.03) 
dit Dependency 
Ratio 
.0005 
(.0009) 
-.0003 
(.0004) 
-.0005 
(.0004) 
-.002***  
(.0005) 
ity  
GDP Per Capita 
 
1.12E-06 
(9.96E-07) 
6.49E-07 
(1.03E-06) 
1.81E-06* 
(1.1E06) 
7.36E-06*** 
(9.89E-07) 
Tit Tax Rev. to GDP .46* 
(.24) 
.45* 
(.13) 
.41*** 
(.13) 
.77*** 
(.13) 
Dummy90_04  
 
-.04** 
(.02) 
-.07*** 
(.01) 
-.08*** 
(.02) 
 
Dummy95_09  -.06*** 
(.02) 
-.1*** 
(.02) 
-.11*** 
(.02) 
 
Dummy00_04  -.09*** 
(.02) 
-.12*** 
(.02) 
-.13*** 
(.02) 
 
Var 
 
Variance of 
Income 
   -.11*** 
(.01) 
Prov. effects  Yes Yes Yes No 
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Instruments  Git lag1 
Git lag2 
Git lag1 
Git lag2 
Git lag1 
Git lag2 
Sit lag1,  
Git lag1, Git lag2 
DWH test  .08 .000 .000 .07 
1st-stage F stat 
& DF (Shea R2) 
 5.83, 2 
(.16) 
17.57, 2 31.65, 2 166.02, 3 
131.47, 3 
Over-
identifying  
J stat 
 .69 .95 .98 79-04 
# Obs. (years)  224 (1979-2004) 427 (1979-2004) 427 (1979-2004) 423 
Adj. R-square  .57 .51 .53 .47 
F-stat               19.12 31.22 31.8 58.35 
      
Note: * denotes 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance levels 
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Table 4: Estimation Results of Different Sample Period 1995-2004 (Dependent Variable: 
Household Consumption to GDP) 
 
Regressors 
(symbol) 
Regressors Model 9 
(1995-2004) 
Model 10 
(1995-2004 with 
real interest 
rate) 
  
Yˆ  GDP Growth 
Rate) 
-0.0002 
(.0007) 
-0.003 
(.0007) 
  
∏it  Inflation 0.001 
(.001) 
0.005* 
(.002) 
  
Sit  State 
Sector Size 
.08* 
(.05) 
.11** 
(.04) 
  
Git  Gov’t Spending 
on health etc. 
1.04*** 
(.32) 
.94** 
(.43) 
  
Fit Financial Dev. 
Indicator 
 .02** 
(.008) 
 .005* 
(.003) 
  
Uit Share of Urban 
Employment 
-.02 
(.12) 
-.07 
(.09) 
  
dit Dependency 
Ratio 
.0004 
(.002) 
-.0002 
(.001) 
  
ity  
GDP Per Capita 
 
1.26E-07 
(1.17E-06) 
4.01E-07 
(1.03E-06) 
  
Tit Tax Rev. to GDP .40 
(.35) 
.34 
(.32) 
  
Dummy00_04  
 
.001 
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
  
rit Real Interest 
Rate 
 .006 
(.03) 
  
      
Prov. effects  Yes Yes   
Time effects  Yes Yes   
Instruments  Sit lag1 
Git lag1 
Git lag2 
Sit lag1 
Git lag1 
Git lag2 
  
DWH test  .02 .001   
1st-stage F stat 
& DF (Shea R2) 
 10.63, 3 
1.58, 3 (.07) 
8.24, 3 
1.19, 3 (.06) 
  
Over-
identifying  
J stat 
 .71 .49   
Time Range  96-04 96-04   
# of Obs.  244 244   
Adj. R-square  .06 .10   
F-stat   12.29 12.64   
      
Note: * denotes 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance levels 
 
 
 
